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Abstract
We revisit the hypotheses of unequal exchange and deteriorating
terms of trade in the specific context of import-intensive, export-
led strategies of developing countries which rely on integration into
GVCs for access to markets in developed countries using a stylized
two-country two-commodity Classical- Marxian trade model. Two
sources of asymmetry can be distinguished: market power arising
from the competition between suppliers that depresses the prices at
which the final good is supplied; and monopoly power arising from
the lead firms control and ownership of intangible assets including
brand and design. The model explores some implications of these
two sources of asymmetry.
Keywords: Unequal Exchange, Global Value Chains, Classical Trade
Model
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1 Introduction
The framework of global value chain (GVC) and global production network
(GPN) analysis has been used to analyze the recent cross-border expansion
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and dispersion of production led by the initiatives of large corporations
[Dicken (2011), Henderson et al, (2002), Gereffi et al (2001), Gereffi and
Korzeniewicz (1994)]. This framework challenged the conventional mea-
sures of export performance and international competitiveness, turning the
spotlight on the growing importance of value added-trade and the import-
intensiveness of exports. A GVC of a final product, which is either con-
sumed or invested, is defined as the value added of all activities that are
directly and indirectly needed to produce it [Timmer et al (2014), pp. 100].
The fact that it is a value chain comes from the fact that the production
process is fragmented and carried out in different firms. The fact that it is
a global value chain refers to the fact that these firms are distributed across
many countries (and also typically across many industries) over the globe.
About 70 percent of global trade is associated with GVCs, with services,
raw materials, intermediate goods, parts and components increasingly be-
ing imported and incorporated into final consumer products that are then
traded in international markets [OECD (2020)]. While there has been a
slight decline after the 2008-09 crisis, and the outbreak of the COVID-19
pandemic has also had a disruptive impact on the functioning of GVCs, they
remain pervasive in shaping trade and the global division of labor. As cor-
porations restructured their operations, through outsourcing and offshoring,
different stages of the production process were relocated to different parts
of the world. This development also led to a changing pattern of special-
ization, with developing countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America,
becoming the new loci for the fabrication and assembly of a range of final
goods.
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GVC’s are instrumental in forging a global divison labor under the con-
trol of lead corporations that accentuate inequality and concentrate rev-
enues and wealth while offering a limited scope for upgradation [Selwyn
and Leyden (2021)]. Further, the increasing share of manufactures in the
export basket of developing countries has also been associated with a de-
cline in the manufacture-to-manufacture terms of trade for developing coun-
tries against developed countries since the mid-eighties [Sarkar and Singer
(1993), Chakraborty (2012)].
This suggests that the issues of unequal exchange, deteriorating terms of
trade and dependency highlighted by [Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950), Singer
(1975), Emmanuel (1972)] in the context when developing countries spe-
cialized in the export of primary commodities and imported manufactured
products from developing countries remain relevant even with the diversifi-
cation of developing country exports towards manufactured goods as they
were integrated into GVCs. In this context, it becomes pertinent to ask the
following question: what is the scope for escaping from the trap of adverse
terms of trade in the context of the fragmentation of production within
such vertically coordinated, hierarchical structures of trade and production
that exploit low-wage workers in developing countries? The skewed distri-
bution of value-added towards the lead firm in the core which capture bulk
of the value -added while suppliers in the periphery confront difficulties in
upgrading since the gains in productivity were swamped by deteriorating
prices, constitute a global process of uneven development [Smichowski et al
(2021)].1
1[Smichowski et al (2021)] delineate three distinct developmental patterns associated
with GVC integration: the first cluster corresponding to the reproduction of the core
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We revisit the hypotheses of unequal exchange and deteriorating terms of
trade in the specific context of import-intensive, export-led strategies of de-
veloping countries which rely on integration into GVCs for access to markets
in developed countries. [Milberg and Winkler (2013)] had underscored the
relevance of the classical dynamic trade model in understanding how trade
affects distribution, profitability and accumulation when conducted within
the institutional structure of GVCs. However, the asymmetric power exer-
cised by lead firms within the institutional framework of GVCs is at odds
with the doctrine of comparative advantage [Selwyn and Leyden (2021)] .
Offshoring of production within value chains, instead reaffirms the relevance
of absolute advantage and low unit wage costs (rather than comparative ad-
vantage) in determining the pattern of trade [Baldone et al (2007), Milberg
and Winkler (2013)]. In that spirit, we present a Classical-Marxian model
of trade with two countries and two goods to investigate the implication of
trade relations for unequal exchange in a context where developing countries
import intermediates and capital goods as the basis for the production, and
export the final consumer good within the institutional structure of GVCs.
GVCs structures are complex and involve many developing countries
and multiple cross-border transactions, including trade in services, parts
and components of final goods which are then exported for final assembly
elsewhere. The stylized model presented here, however, strips down the
structure of GVCs to a simplified two-country two-good framework as a
first pass at clarifying the basic pattern of unequal exchange embedded in
comprising developed countries, a second corresponding to the pattern of unequal growth,
including developing countries in Asia, to a third corresponding to what they call the
social upgrading mirage. The focus of this paper is the relation between the first two
clusters
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trade within GVCs structures in the specific case of manufacture of import-
intensive final consumption-goods. We capture the asymmetries of GVC
arrangements by positing that the production of intermediate inputs (which
happens in the North) is capital and skill intensive and the production of
the final consumer good (which happens in the South) is low-skill labour
intensive. Our model shows that Southern firms are at a disadvantageous
position due to both the market power of Northern firms and also due to the
monopoly power of Northern firms arising from the ownership of intangible
capital. Hence, issues of unequal exchange and terms of trade deterioration
remain relevant even in GVC arrangements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an
overview of the asymmetry within the GVC institutional structure of the
relation between the lead firm in the North and the producer firms in the
South. We distinguish market power arising from the competition between
suppliers in Southern economies with surplus labour that depresses the
prices at which the final good is supplied; and monopoly power arising
from the lead firms’ control and ownership of intangible assets including
brand and design. Section 3 presents the basic model of two-country, two-
commodity trade. In section 4 and 5 we explore two alternative closures of
the model that correspond, respectively, to market power of Northern firms
(due to surplus labour in the South) and monopoly power of Northern firms
(due to ownership of intangible capital). The final section concludes with
thoughts about future research.
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2 Market power and monopoly power within
GVCs
Trade within GVCs is determined by the strategies of the lead firms engaged
in cross-border production. The coordination and control of increasingly
complex GVCs has been facilitated by the revolution in information and
communication technology - what has been termed the second unbundling
[Baldwin (2016)] - on the one hand and on the other by the adoption of
trade liberalization policies, and the paradigm of export-led development
strategies by developing countries. This structure allows the analysis of
GVCs from two contrasting vantage points: that of governance, i.e. the
organization and coordination of GVCs by the lead-firm in the North, and
that of upgrading i.e. the strategies used by countries, regions and firms in
the South to climb up the value chain ladder from low value-added activities
to high value added activities [Gereffi (2014)].
The so-called smile curve (see Figure 1) offers a stylized representation
of the distribution of value-added across the GVC [Meng et al, (2020)]. The
pre-production stages of R&D design and logistics and the post-production
stages of marketing and after-sales services which are concentrated in the
lead firm, typically in developed countries, have a higher share of value-
added than the production stages that are located in developing countries.
The smile curve would become deeper and steeper, as depicted in Figure 1 in
the movement from the dashed to the solid curve, because of two processes
[Durand and Milberg (2020)].













































Figure 1: The Smile Curve.
structures within GVCs [Milberg and Winkler (2013)]. This asymmetry
emerges as a result of the polarization between the market power of dom-
inant lead firms and lower-tier supplier firms specializing in assembly and
fabrication that are subject to intense competition. The market power of
the lead firm, is reflected in the capacity to squeeze the supplier firms,
and competition manifests in a race to the bottom as suppliers compete by
squeezing labor costs. Labour costs can be squeezed by supplier firms in
the periphery (or semi-periphery) of the global capitalist economy because
of the presence of large reserves of surplus labour in these economies.
The fragmentation of production also segments the workforce, pitting
workers in the South against each other and against workers in the North,
weakening the bargaining power of workers. The decomposition of the
value-added across GVCs, in the [Timmer et al (2014)] study, found that
the overall share of capital in value-added rose by more than 6 percent
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between 1995-2008, while that of medium and low-skilled workers fell by
around 4 percent, the latter consistent with the presence of large reserves
of low and medium-skilled labour in developing economies. [Chen et al
(2018)] document a decline in the labor share in GVCs from 56 percent
in 2000 to about 51 percent in 2014. The share of low-skilled workers fell
more sharply outside the group of high-income countries (by 6.3 percent
compared to 4.9 percent in the former) in this period. The decline in the
share of wages reflects the impact of segmentation and intensified compe-
tition among suppliers in weakening the position of workers, globally, and
especially in labour surplus economies.
The second process relates to monopoly power arising from the concen-
tration of ownership and control over intellectual, intangible capital with
the lead firm [Durand and Milberg (2020)]. This intangible capital includes
designs and technology patents, software, market intelligence, brand-name,
etc. These intangible assets are connected to the high-value-added, pre
and post-production stages of the GVC. The information and communica-
tion flows that enable the integration of GVCs also imply that intangible
capital plays a key role in the coordination and control of the GVC. The
concentration of intangible assets in lead firms in developed countries is
also associated with a specialization in high-skilled labor activities in these
countries [Timmer et al (2014)]. [Chen et al (2018)] decompose the value
added within GVCs taking into account the share accruing to intangible
capital. Their study finds that the share of intangible capital (measured
as a residual) accounted for much of the decline in labor share between
2000-2014, and at around 30 percent in 2014 dwarfed the share of tangi-
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ble capital (which was around 18 percent). Further, there is a shift in the
share of income away from the production stage, with the upstream stages
(including marketing and distribution), where intangible assets are concen-
trated, accounting for about three-quarters of the value-added across the
different stages of the chain in 2014 [Chen et al (2018)].
The concentration of ownership of intangible capital is thus associated
with monopoly rents accruing to the lead firms controlling the GVCs. In-
tangible capital like patents and brand names are different from traditional
capital assets in that they involve large magnitudes of often firm-specific
fixed costs [Timmer et al (2014)]. These large fixed costs give rise to non-
competitive product markets and the ability to charge mark-ups over cost.
The monopoly arising from fixed costs is reinforced by regimes of intellec-
tual property rights, enforced by governments.
Stricter intellectual property rights and proprietary control over stan-
dards, technologies and brands, innovational advantages of control over the
chain and natural monopoly associated with economies of scale and network
externalities associated with GVCs are the sources of increasing monopoly
rents accruing to lead firms [Durand and Milberg (2020)] Thus, while the
horizontal competition among suppliers exerts a downward pressure on the
smile curve squeezing the share of value-added at the middle production
stages in developing countries; there is also a concomitant process of sharp-
ening the slope of at the two ends of the smile curve that is associated
with control over intangible assets [Durand and Milberg (2020)]. This is
reflected in the process of value erosion as the sectoral shares of domestic
value-added in developing country exports declines with integration GVCs
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[Caraballo and Jiang (2016)]. The GVC represents a concentration of con-
trol in the hands of corporate lead-firms in the North as against the small,
dispersed producers in the South.
Given the limited scope for capturing value at the final-assembly/production
stages of the GVC, integrating into GVCs controlled by global corporations
in order to access markets in North creates new dependencies for developing
countries specializing in low-wage manufacturing. [Heintz (2006)] presents
a model of unequal exchange that investigates the unequal distribution of
benefits (value-added) between the lead firm and the lower-tier supplier
firms in developing countries based on the decomposition of the price of
the final good between lead firm and subcontractors.The distribution of the
gains from increased productivity of the supplier firms depends on whether
these gains are captured in the form of higher monopoly rents for the brand-
name lead-firm or in the form of lower prices for the final good. An increase
in demand from the affluent consumer markets in the north, however, would
lead to income convergence if this demand is sufficiently income elastic. An
important implication is the delinking of production in the south from its
domestic market as exports and consumption in the north drives demand
[Heintz (2006)].
The source of unequal exchange in [Heintz (2006)] arises on one hand
from branding and other associated forms of monopoly and on the other
from competitive sourcing from suppliers. It relates to the two-fold dynamic
outlined above that make the GVC smile curve deeper and steeper. The
dynamic is embedded in the two forms of power asymmetry: (a) the market
power of the lead firm sourcing from competing suppliers in developing
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countries, and (b) the monopoly power associated with the ownership of
intangible capital in the global economy.
The model presented in this paper also approaches the relation between
lead firms in the North and producer firms in the South within GVCs from
the lens of unequal exchange. The focus is on North-South trade relations
and we put forward a more traditional classical-Marxian trade model to
address the implications for terms of trade and distribution.
Unequal exchange has been analyzed from a Marxian analytical per-
spective by [Emmanuel (1972)] in a context of free capital mobility as an
outcome of lower wages and a higher level of exploitation in the developing
countries. As a result, trade involves the exchange of goods produced with
a higher content of labor in the South for goods produced with relatively
lower content of labor produced in the North. Within the structuralist tra-
dition, [Singer (1950)] and [Prebisch (1950)], ascribe the deteriorating terms
of trade faced by countries in the South to the lower elasticity of demand
for the primary goods exported by these countries and more downwardly
flexible wages. As a result, productivity gains in the South is reflected in
deteriorating terms of trade. [Bacha (1978)] brings these two approaches
together as alternative closures in a general equilibrium model focussing on
the relative employment in the South as the strategic variable.
Before presenting our model we should note the wide range of North-
South models of uneven trade in the structuralist tradition [Dutt, Darity
and Davis (2005)]. These models involve different specifications and closures
for the North and the South. These could be based on:
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1. different rates of profit and rates of exploitation,
2. different import and export elasticities of exports and imports of the
North and South,
3. different macro-economic closures (e.g. classical closure for the South
and Keynesian closure for the North).
However, the traditional pattern of trade analyzed in this literature,
with the South specializing in primary commodity exports, and the North
in the export of manufactures has been replaced by a pattern where the
South produces and exports final goods through GVCs, while importing
intermediate goods from the North. It is this new situation that we analyze
in this paper.
3 Basic Model
We present a stylized classical-Marxian model of trade investigating some of
the implications of the emergence of GVCs, and the outsourcing of segments
of the production process that are coordinated and controlled by corporate
headquarters in the North, to locations in the South.
The limited purpose of our model is to explain some of the distributional
implications of GVC trade and the monopoly and market power exercised
by the lead Northern firms. A key characteristic of trade mediated within
GVCs is that production locations in the South use technology, intermediate
and capital goods and design specifications from the lead firm in the North
to produce or assemble final goods that are then exported to the North. We
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ignore other sectors and inter-sectoral linkages in the countries, focusing
only on the sectors directly engaged in GVC trade. We also abstract from
considerations of demand elasticities and investment demand to focus on the
structural relation between trade and production within the GVC structure.
The model is a two-country, two-class, two-good circulating capital model
in the classical-Marxian tradition. There are two countries, the North and
South respectively, and two commodities – an intermediate good and a final
consumption good (denoted by subscripts 1 and 2 respectively). The North
specializes in the production of the intermediate good used for production
of both goods, while the South specializes in the production of the con-
sumption good, which is produced using the intermediate good imported
from the North. Trade corresponds to a production process that is dis-
persed across the North and South. The model is set up to investigate the
implications of this pattern of trade. However, the demand for consumption
goods produced by GVC supplier in the South arises from both the North
and the South, and production is not exclusively for export to the north.
Since each country specializes in the production of one good, the sub-
script 1 refers to the North and the subscript 2 refers to the the South. The
price system is given by:
p1 = (1 + r1)(w1l1 + p1k1) (1)
p2 = (1 + r2)(w2l2 + p1k2) (2)
where ri, is the rate of profit, wi the nominal wage rate, li the amount of
labor used to produce one unit of good i (the inverse of labor productivity),
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ki the physical units of good 1 used to produce 1 unit of good i, and pi is
price of the i-th good. Let p = p1/p2 denote the terms of trade between
the two countries, and ωi = wi/p2 denote the real wage rate in country i in
terms of the consumption good (produced exclusively by the South). Using
the terms of trade and the real wage rates in the two countries, the price
system can be written as
p = (1 + r1)(ω1l1 + pk1), (3)
1 = (1 + r2)(ω2l2 + pk2). (4)
We assume that workers spend their entire wage income on the con-
sumption good, i.e. good 2. On the other hand, the entire profits of the
capitalists are invested. We do not formulate a separate investment demand
function. The profits of capitalists, Ri in each country are given by
R1 = r1(ω1l2 + pk1)x1, (5)
R2 = r2(ω2l2 + pk2)x2, (6)
where xi is the real output of good i. The profits are used to purchase addi-
tional intermediate goods ripkixi and hire workers riωilixi, both expressed
in units of the consumption good.
The value of South’s imports of good 1 is given by p1(1 + r2)k2x2, where
p1k2x2 is the South’s demand for replacing the used up intermediate inputs,
and r2p1k2x2 is the South’s demand to meet the needs for expansion (coming
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from investment of profits in the South). In a similar way, the value of
the South’s exports of good 2 is given by (1 + r1)w1l1x1, where w1l1x1
is the North’s demand for consumption goods that is needed to carry on
production at the existing level, and r1w1l1x1 is the North’s demand for
consumption goods to take account of expansion (due to reinvestment of
profits). Assuming that trade is balanced, we have
(1 + r1)ω1l1x1 = p1(1 + r2)k2x2. (7)
Let x = x2/x1 be the ratio of the output in the South (good 2) to the
output in the North (good 1). Then, dividing the trade balance condition
through by p2 gives us
x =
ω1l1 (1 + r1)
pk2 (1 + r2)
. (8)
Summarizing the discussion so far, we see that the basic model has four
endogenous variables, the terms of trade, p, the profit rate in the North and
South, r1, r2, and the relative output ratio, x, but only three equations:
1 = (1 + r2)(ω2l2 + pk2), (9)
p = (1 + r1)(ω1l1 + pk1), (10)
x =
ω1l1 (1 + r1)
pk2 (1 + r2)
. (11)
Hence, we need one more equation to close the model. In this paper, we
will explore two closures of the model. In a first closure we assume that
the terms of trade is fixed by market power of Northern firms in the world
market at some level p̄. In this case, the profit rates in the two countries
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will be unequal in general (due to barriers to mobility of capital from the
South to the North, the existence of large fixed costs for the firms in the
North, etc.). The North uses its dominant market position to set the terms
of trade and ensure that Northern firms earn a higher rate of profit on their
capital than Southern firms.
In the second closure, firms in the North derive power from their owner-
ship and control of intangible capital and this enables them to extract what
we terms a monopoly rent. To analyze this closure, we can understand the
Northern firms’ monopoly premium or quasi-rent as a rate of return over
and above the rate of profit that Southern firms earn. This monopoly rent
can be conceptualized as a reflection of the power Northern firms’ derive
from the ownership of intangibles. Unlike capital advanced to hire labor or
purchase intermediate inputs, intangible capital does not increase produc-
tive capacity. It includes the brand identity, goodwill, design and market
access of the lead firm in the North. From the perspective of distribution,
what is important is that the ability to extract this monopoly rent effec-
tively ensures a higher rate of return on the capital invested by Northern
firms compared to those in the South.
The North can thus exercise its control either by deploying its market
power to control the terms of trade or by using its monopoly power to
extract monopoly rents. By presenting the two closures separately we can
distinguish two distinct sources of power that the North exercises: market
power through control over terms of trade (which is made possible by the
existence of large reserves of surplus labour in the South) and monopoly
power (which is made possible by the ownership of intangible capital). In
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both closures, we do not allow for mobility of labour across countries and
real wage rates differ across the two countries.
We start by laying out our assumptions about technology, costs and
prices.
Assumption 1. The technology of production in the North and South
differ because they carry out different parts of the production process, i.e.
the North produces the intermediate inputs and the South produces the
final good. To characterize such a context, we assume that
(a) the real wage rate is higher in the North than in the South, i.e. ω1 >
ω2;
(b) the input-intensity of production is higher in the north, i.e. k1 > k2;







(d) the terms of trade, p, consistent with a zero profit rate in the South








The first assumption, that the wages in the North are higher than wages
in the South, is natural. After all, the lead firm in the North deploys
the GVC framework to outsource the production of the final good 2 to
the South in order to take advantage of lower wage costs. Note that the
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choice of technique problem pertains solely to the lead firm outsourcing part
of the production process within GVC contractual arrangements which tie
the supplier firms in the south into producing the final good using imported
intermediates.
The second and third assumptions relate to the technology of produc-
tion. Superior technology is used by the lead firm in the North, which
translates into a higher input-intensity of production, i.e. k1 > k2. The use
of superior technology also implies that the share of wage cost in total cost
of production is lower in the North than in the South. This is because the
superior technology, which is used in the North, is more capital-intensive.







which then leads to the expression in Assumption 1 (c). Thus the pattern
of specialization where the low-wage South produces the labor-intensive
final good results in the unit wage cost to unit intermediate costs, or al-
ternatively, the share of labor costs in unit costs in the South being higher
relative to the North.
The final assumption relates to the terms of trade and we will explain
this in section 4.3 and use it in the discussion in section 5.
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4 Market Power of North
This closure reflects the control that the corporate headquarters in the
North have in setting the terms within value chains. Hence, market power
of Northern firms can set the terms of trade at a level of their choosing:
p̄. The production/ assembly of the final good can be moved to another
location if the terms are not favorable in any given country, compelling the
Southern firms to accept the terms of trade imposed by the Northern firm
or be pushed out of the market. Note that the extreme competition between
supplier firms is made possible by the existence of large reserves of surplus
labour in Southern economies. Thus, for given level of wage rates, the rate
of profit in the South will adjust to maintain the competitive price for good
2 and access the market in North through the value chain. We capture the
market power of the Northern firm directly by its ability to set the terms
of trade,
p = p̄. (12)
The model with the market power closure has four endogenous variables,
p, r1, r2, x and four equations, (9), (10), (11), and (12). Using this model,
we would like to investigate two sets of questions. First, since the terms of
trade is set by Northern firms, we are left with three endogenous variables
that change with parameters of the model, x, r1 and r2. We are interested in
understanding how changes in the different parameters affect these endoge-
nous variables. The second question we would like to investigate relates to
the terms of trade fixed by Northern firms. Are there bounds within which
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the terms of trade that will be chosen by Northern firms will lie? Is it in
the interest of Northern firms to attain a value of the terms of trade that
is neither too low nor too high?
4.1 Output Ratio







which shows that ∂x/∂ωi > 0, ∂x/∂li > 0, and ∂x/∂ki < 0.
An increase in wages, in both the North and the South, leads to an
increase in the relative output (and hence employment) in the South. Rising
wages increases the demand for the output of the South. However, given
the fixed price p̄, the increase in wages would squeeze the profits of the
Southern capitalist. The output ratio x also increases with a rise in the
labor input needed for one unit of output in either country. An increase in
labor productivity, would therefore decrease output in the South relative
to the North, reflecting a decline in labor employment and a corresponding
decline in the demand for the consumption good.
Interestingly, the impact of the Northern firms’ market power has an
ambiguous effect on relative output:
∂x/∂p̄ ≷ 0 if (ω1l1/k1) ≷ (ω2l2/k2)
This implies that the South will lose in terms of relative output from an
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increase in p̄ when (ω1l1/k1) < (ω2l2/k2), i.e. when the ratio of spending
on wages to that on the intermediate good is higher in the South than in
the North. But the in Assumption 1 (c) ensures that this condition holds.
Thus, the pattern of specialization that emerges within the GVC framework
leads to a disadvantageous position for Southern firms in terms of volume
of output. As the market power of Northern firms increase and they raise
the terms of trade, Southern firms will lose because output will fall. The
intuition for this result is straightforward. When the terms of trade rise,
the wage good becomes less expensive in relative terms. Hence, trade can
be balanced by a lower import by the North of the Southern output (final
goods). This implies a lower level of the output ratio, x.
4.2 Profit Rates





Hence, ∂r2/∂ω2 < 0, ∂r2/∂l2 < 0, ∂r2/∂k2 < 0, and ∂r2/∂p̄ < 0. Note
that the real wage rate, labour productivity and the intermediate input-
coefficient in the North has no effect on the rate of profit in the South. The
main channel through which trade impacts the rate of profit in the South
is through the terms of trade. If Northern firms raise the terms of trade, p̄,
then the rate of profit in the South falls. If the southern producer responds
to deteriorating terms of trade by squeezing wages, then relative output
would be adversely affected.
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Hence, ∂r1/∂ω1 < 0, ∂r1/∂l1 < 0, ∂r1/∂k1 < 0, and ∂r1/∂p̄ > 0.
2 Just
as in the case of the South, the real wage rate, labour productivity and
intermediate-input coefficient of the South has no effect on the rate of profit
in the North. The terms of trade has the expected effect: If Northern firms
raise the terms of trade, p̄, then the rate of profit in the North rises.
4.3 Terms of Trade
Given that Northern firms have the market power to set the terms of trade,
p, between the intermediate and final good, it is natural to ask whether
there are bounds that Northern firms would want the terms of trade to
lie within? In fact, there are two considerations that suggest that it is in
the interest of Northern firms to neither choose a high nor a low terms of
trade, but rather to ensure that it lies within a given interval. On the one
hand, the terms of trade cannot be pushed up beyond a value that makes
the rate of profit in the South zero. If the terms of trade is pushed higher
than this level, then Southern firms will no longer participate in the GVC
arrangement. This participation constraint gives us the upper bound for the
terms of trade, p′. On the other hand, the terms of trade cannot be pushed
down below the level that will make the rate of profit in the North lower
than in the South. Being the dominant player in the GVC arrangement,
2Note that ∂r1/∂p̄ > 0 because 0 < k1 < 1.
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Northern firms would never participate if their rate of profit fell below the
profit rate of the junior partner, the Southern firm. This consideration
provides the lower bound for the terms of trade, p̃.
Result 1. Let p̄ be the terms of trade chosen by Northern firms. Given

















The proof of this result is given in the appendix. To understand the
intuition behind the condition that ensures the inequality, note that p̃ cor-
responds to the positive terms of trade when r2 = r1 (for details, see the
appendix). We can now make sense of, and understand the role of, As-
sumption 1 (d). From (9), we can see that 1−ω2l2
k2
corresponds to the terms
of trade when r2 = 0. From (10), we can see that
ω1l1
1−k1 corresponds to the
terms of trade when r1 = 0. Assumption 1 (d) states that the former is
higher than the latter, i.e. the terms of trade corresponding to a zero profit
rate in the South is higher than the terms of trade associated with a zero
profit rate in the North. This assumption makes sense because the rate of
profit in the North should be an increasing function of the terms of trade,
which is just another way of saying that it is in the interest of Northern
firms to have a relatively higher terms of trade, p = p1/p2, because North-
ern firms sell good 1. Hence, the magnitude of the terms of trade which
would force Northern firms to quit the GVC arrangement - when r1 = 0 -
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would be lower than the magnitude of the terms of trade that would allow
them to participate, while at the same time forcing Southern firms to quit
- when r2 = 0.
Result 1 shows that p̃ < p′, and that Northern firms will choose to set
the terms of trade, p̄, at a magnitude that lies in the closed interval [p̃, p′]. If
they push the terms of trade higher than p′, then firms from the South will
no longer participate in the GVC arrangement (because their rate of profit
would become negative). On the other hand, firms in the North would not
allow the terms of trade to fall below p̃ because that would make their rate
of profit lower than what prevails in the South. The exact magnitude of
the terms of trade will be determined, within this interval, by the relative
bargaining power of the two regions and more specifically by the market
power exercised by the North, but there are clear bounds to the movement
of terms of trade.
5 Monopoly Power from Intangible Capital
Ownership
Production organized through GVCs by lead firms give rise to a specific
international division of labour. Lead firms in the North specialize in high-
skilled and capital-intensive parts of the production process and firms in the
South are forced to specialize in low-skill intensive parts of the production.
Part of the high-skilled and capital-intensive production process is geared
towards the production of intangible capital, like brands, designs (which
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can then be patented), and marketing networks. Since intangible capital
involve large fixed costs, they give rise to monopoly market structures. The
ownership and control of intangible capital therefore entails extraction of
rent - which we capture in a second closure of the basic model. In this
second closure of our model, the North does not exercise direct control over
the price of the final good exported from the South, as we had posited in
the first closure. Rather, the North exercises power through its dominant
position in the value chain by capturing additional revenues/rents from the
South, so that the returns earned by Northern firms (which includes profit
and rent) is always higher than the returns earned by firms in the South.
The Southern countries depend on the North for access to this intangible
capital. This access does not by itself expand productive capacity but it
allows the South to use the brands, designs and marketing capacity of the
North to initiate production of final goods through contractual relations
with the Northern firms. These contractual relations allow the South to sell
the final good assembled and produced by it (using the intangible capital
and intermediate inputs from the North) in both the global (North) and
domestic (South) market. In effect, therefore, the GVC has forged a global
division of labor where the production of final goods for the global market
has been relocated to the South, but is dependent on key intermediate
inputs and access to intangible capital owned and controlled by the North.
We incorporate this revenue extraction, by postulating that the North
is able to extract returns above the rate of profit earned by the Southern
firm, or the general rate of profit. This positive premium is represented
by α, a parameter that represents a form of monopoly rent extracted from
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the South by North. Thus the price charged for the intermediate input
produced by the North is given by
p1 = (w1l1 + p1k1) + r(w1l1 + p1k1) + α(w1l1 + p1k1),
where the first component is the recovery of cost, the second is the profit
earned, and the third is a quasi-rent earned because of ownership of intan-
gible capital. Final goods produced in the South are exported to the North
and directly sold in the South, and the price of the final good is determined
as before,
p2 = (w2l2 + p1k2) + r(w2l2 + p1k2),
where the first term is the recovery of cost and the second term is the profit
income. It is important to note that the rate of return of firms in the South
is r and the rate of return of the lead firm in the North is r+ α. Hence, as
long as α > 0, the lead firm is able to earn a higher rate of return than the
junior partner in the GVC arrangement.
5.1 Case 1: Rent is Not Invested
The first case we analayze is one where rents accruing to the North are not
reinvested but instead used for unproductive expenditure (say non-tradable
services). In this case the trade balance condition given in (7) would remain
unchanged. So in this case, we have three endogenous variables, r, p, x, and
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the following three equations to capture the model:
1 = (1 + r)(ω2l2 + pk2), (13)





Result 2. If 0 < α < 1/k1, the solution of the above system for positive
terms of trade, p, is given by,
p =
(k1 + αω1l1k2) − ω2l2(1 − αk1)
2k2 (1 − αk1)
+
√{
(k1 + αω1l1k2) − ω2l2(1 − αk1)






The proof follows easily by using the two price equations, (13) and (14),
to eliminate the rate of profit, r, convert then into a quadratic equation in p,
and then solving for the positive real root of the quadratic. It is important
to note that this solution is valid only under the assumption on α, i.e. the
monopoly power (arising out of ownership of intangible capital) must be
bounded above by 1/k1 for a meaningful solution to the terms of trade to
be ensured. Too much monopoly power will mean there is no GVC trade.
Thus, ∂p/∂α > 0.3 Along expected lines, an increase in the ability of
the North to extract quasi-rents exerts an upward pressure on the terms
of trade, p. Further ∂p/∂ω1 > 0, ∂p/∂l1 > 0 and ∂p/∂k1 > 0. Thus, an
increase in the real wage rate, a fall in labour productivity and an increase
3To see this easily note that in the expression for p, α occurs on the numerator with
positive and in the denominator with negative signs.
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in the intermediate input coefficient in the North all put an upward pressure
on the terms of trade. Interestingly, the analogous changes in the South
have ambiguous effects on the terms of trade, i.e. we cannot ascertain the
signs of ∂p/∂ω2, ∂p/∂l2 and ∂p/∂k2 < 0 without further assumptions.
The extraction of monopoly quasi-rents by Northern firms creates a dis-
tinct output disadvantage for the firms in the South. To see this, note
that ∂p/∂α > 0 and under the assumption that rents are not reinvested,
the trade balance condition is x = ω1l1/pk2. Hence, an increase in α will
reduce the relative output of the South, i.e.
∂x/∂α < 0. (16)
This means that an increase in the ability to extract monopoly quasi-rents
by firms in the North decreases the output of the South relative to the
North. Rents divert demand away from the consumption good produced by
the South so that trade balance is re-established where the relative output
of the South is lower than before the increase in monopoly rents by the lead
firm in the North.
5.2 Case 2: Rent is Invested
Now let us consider the case where the entire rents are reinvested. When
the rents are also invested, then the price equations, (13) and (14), remain
unchanged. The trade balance condition changes due to the addition of the


























An increase in α would lower relative output of the South if the ratio
of the wage cost to the requirement of the intermediate input per unit of
output in South is higher than in the North, i.e. if the organic composition
of capital is higher in the North than in the South. This is precisely the
condition underlying the pattern of specialization within the GVC frame-
work as captured by Assumption 1 (c). Note that, in the first closure of our
model, this pattern of specialization also has the effect of squeezing relative
output in the South when the terms of trade increases.
The rate of profit, r, and α, the parameter capturing monopoly quasi-
rents, are negatively related to each other. Since
1 + r =
1
ω2l2 + pk2
and ∂p/∂α > 0, we see that ∂r/∂α < 0. To see this more explicitly, note
that 1 + r can be derived from the two price equations as:
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1 + r = −α
2













Thus, ∂r/∂α < 0 4 Hence, when Northern firms increase the extraction
of monopoly quasi-rents, by increasing α, the general rate of profit falls.
While they gain in terms of rent extraction, they lose in terms of profits
earned. However, the lower general rate of profit also implies a redistri-
bution from capitalists in the South to capitalists in the North through
rent extraction. Hence, an increase in α unambiguously hurts the material
interests of Southern firms participation in GVC arrangements.
There is however, an upper bound to α set by the condition that r = 0.









(1 − k1) (1 − ω2l2)
ω1l1k2 + k1 (1 − ω2l2)
. (17)
If α is raised beyond this level, the rate of profit earned by firms in the
South will become negative. Southern firms will not participate in GVC
arrangements in such a situation. Hence, the monopoly parameter α cannot
be raised above this maximum level, α′.
4This can be easily inferred from the negative sign associated with each α in the
expression for 1 + r.
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It is easy to check that α′ < 1/k1, the condition that underlies the
derivation of the positive terms of trade in the closure with monopoly power
deriving from intangibles (see Result 2). To see this, note that because the
wage share has to be less than unity, we have ω2l2 < 1.
5 Since k1 > 0, we
have,
k1 (1 + α
′) =
k1 (1 − ω2l2)
ω1l1k2 + k1 (1 − ω2l2)
= 1 − ω1l1k2
ω1l1k2 + k1 (1 − ω2l2)
< 1 + k1.
so that




It is also interesting to note that







which is the assumption about terms of trade captured in Assumption 1
(d) and underlies Result 1 on the bounds of terms of trade in the case of
the exercise of market power. Thus, as long as Assumption 1 (d) holds
and the monopoly power derived from the ownership of intangible capital is
bounded above (by 1/k1), Northern firms will exercise that monopoly power
to ensure 0 < α < α′ < 1/k1. This will provide incentives for Southern firms
to participate in the GVC arrangement (because r, the rate of profit they
earn, will be positive) and also maintain a higher rate of profit for the lead
firm in the North (because α > 0).
5Note that ω2 is the real wage rate, and 1/l2 is the labour productivity. Hence, ω2l2
is the wage share.
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6 Conclusion
A stylized model of unequal exchange within the GVC framework has been
presented in this paper to clarify certain features of dependency that are
embedded in the structure of GVC trade. Lead firms in the North initiate
GVC production by shifting low-skilled, low-productivity parts of the pro-
duction process to low-wage economies in the global South. In our model,
we capture this by positing a pattern of specialization where the South pro-
duces final goods consumed by workers in the North and the South, using
intermediate goods imported from the North. Under certain plausible con-
ditions, this pattern of specialization results in a structure where increasing
labor productivity in both the North and the South could depresses relative
output and employment in the South. This suggests that workers in the
South may not benefit from increasing labor productivity and technological
upgradation.
The asymmetric power structure of the GVC further erodes the scope for
expansion of relative output in the South. Since high capital-intensive and
high skill-intensive parts of the production process are specialized by lead
firms in the North, while low capital-intensive and low skill-intensive parts
are outsourced to the firms in the South, the ratio of wage costs to the cost
of intermediate goods (or the labor intensity of production) in the North
is lower than that in the South. Under this condition both the exercise of
market power by capitalist firms in the North to squeeze the terms of trade
faced by capitalist firms in the South; and the exercise of monopoly power
through its control of intangible assets to extract rents would result in a
squeeze of the output of the South relative to that in the North. Hence,
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it seems that both capitalist firms and workers in Southern countries face
inherent disadvantages when the latter participates in GVCs.
Further, while the model of unequal exchange is meant to focus on North-
South asymmetry within the GVC framework, it also highlights the con-
tradiction between capitalists and workers as a whole. On the one hand,
in order to preserve or increase profits in the face of a squeeze of the terms
of trade, capitalists in the South would attempt to cut unit wage costs -
and thereby adversely affect workers in the South. On the other hand, if a
change in the balance of bargaining power enables the South to push back
against the deteriorating terms of trade, then firms in the North would
respond by cutting wage costs - thereby harming the interests of work-
ers in the North. Thus, the exercise of market power by the lead firm in
the North does not negate the distributional conflict between capital and
labour over wage and profit shares. Even in the case of the deployment of
monopoly power by the North (arising from ownership of intangible cap-
ital), the trade-off between the rate of profit and rents suggests that the
distributional conflict would continue to play a role in both the North and
the South.
The lead firms in the North promote GVCs as a way of reducing costs
by re-locating production to lower wage regions. The premise of GVC inte-
gration for the South is access to wider global markets. Export promotion
enables the producers in the South to escape the limits of domestic market
and constraints of low domestic wages and employment. Thus, conven-
tional policy implications of GVC promotion generally focus on moving up
the value added ladder and to developing supply linkages domestically (i.e.
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reducing the import content of production).
However, the structure of GVC’s tends to push producers in the South
to lower value-added segments of the GVC. The model in this paper high-
lights the role of power asymmetries in this process. This includes market
power arising from the capacity of lead firms to force suppliers in the South
to compete among themselves by cutting unit wage costs, and monopoly
power based on the ownership and control of critical intangible assets. These
power asymmetries, which are pervasive in the contemporary global econ-
omy, suggest a cautious approach for countries in the South while deciding
to jump on the GVC bandwagon.
A final point can be made to signal a fruitful direction for future re-
search. In this paper, we have assumed that the good produced by the
South is a final good, which is consumed by workers in both the North and
the South. This assumption tethers the expansion of output in the South
to its domestic market and to domestic employment. If in contrast, the
product of the South was solely targeted at the market in the North, so
that the South’s output is not consumed domestically, production in the
South would get delinked from its home market and depend on the growth
of output and employment in the North as underscored by [Heintz (2006)].
The present model has also not taken into account capitalist spending on
the consumer good produced in the South. Incorporating capitalist con-
sumption in a situation where the South specializes in exporting a luxury
good that targets the affluent capitalists of the North, would attenuate the
structural dependence of relative output in the South on domestic employ-
ment, since it would no longer be consumed by domestic workers. To the
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extent that the market for the South’s output is oriented disproportionately
to exports, and to capitalist consumption in the north, relative output in
the South would also be disassociated from the domestic market for mass
consumer goods and therefore employment in the South.
This suggests that in order to harness integration within GVCs towards
increasing output and employment in the South, the focus, paradoxically,
has to turn towards developing the domestic market, through wage em-
ployment, rather than narrowly pursuing the export market in the North.
The spillovers associated from GVCs would depend on the extent to which
it is integrated with the domestic market and not just domestic suppliers.
This might seem counter-intuitive, since GVCs have become pervasive as a
vehicle for export-oriented production. If instead they served as means of
coordination of production across borders - not solely to service markets in
the North but more broadly in both the North and the South - they would
offer more scope for the growth of relative output and employment in South.
This however, means turning the premise of GVC integration and export-
oriented production on its head. These implications are worth exploring in
future research that incorporates inter-sectoral linkages within the North
and the South (including with non-tradable sectors), and further specifies
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A Proof of Result 1
Proof. The upper bound for the terms of trade chosen by Northern firms, p̄,
comes from the necessity to make sure that the rate of profit in the South is
positive - otherwise Southern firms will not participate in the GVC. Using
(9), we see that r2 = 0 if and only if p = (1 − ω2l2)/k2. Since ∂r2/∂p̄ < 0,
this gives us the upper bound, p′ = (1 − ω2l2)/k2. The terms of trade will
always be lower than this magnitude, i.e. p̄ ≤ p′.
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The lower bound for p̄ arises from the need to ensure that r1 > r2 -
otherwise the dominant position of Northern firms in the GVC arrangement
will be in jeopardy. Using (9) and (10), we see that the sufficient condition
for r1 > r2 is given by
k2p
2 + (ω2l2 − k1)p− ω1l1 > 0.
Now, consider the quadratic equation in p given by k2p
2 + (ω2l2 − k1)p −
ω1l1 = 0. Since the discriminant of this quadratic equation is positive, the
equation has two real roots. It is also easy to see that one root is positive
and the other negative. Since the terms of trade cannot be negative, the













For values of p larger than this root, the quadratic function will be positive














The terms of trade chosen by Northern firms will always be larger than this
magnitude, i.e. p̃ ≤ p̄.
The final step of the proof comes from showing that p̃ < p′, and this strict
inequality is ensured by Assumption 1 (d): (1 − ω2l2)/k2 > ω1l1/(1 − k1).
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